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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 920463-CA
Priority No. 2

JULIE HARMON,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992 Supp.) provides
this Court's jurisdiction over this non-capital, non-first degree
felony criminal conviction from the district court.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Did the State meet its burden to show that a reasonable
hypothetical officer would have arrested Julie Harmon for driving on
a suspended driver's license in the absence of Detective Russo's
unconstitutional motivation to investigate Ms. Harmon for illegal
drugs?
2. Did the State meet its burden to show that Ms. Harmon's
consent to the search of her home was voluntary and purged of the
taint of her illegal arrest?

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to
suppress, this Court defers to the trial court's findings of fact
under the "clearly erroneous" standard, and reviews legal

conclusions without deference for correctness.

E.g. State v.

Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-782 n.3 (Utah 1991).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Appendix 1 to this brief contains the full text of the
following controlling constitutional and statutory provisions:
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 14
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
United States Constitution, Amendment V
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV
Utah Code Ann. section 41-2-136 (1992 Cum. Supp.)
Utah Code Ann. section 77-7-2 (1990 Repl. Vol.)
Utah Code Ann. section 77-7-18 (1992 Cum. Supp.).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged Julie Harmon with three counts of
possession of a controlled substance, two third degree felony
counts, and one class B misdemeanor (R. 6-8). The magistrate bound
over one felony and one misdemeanor count relating to drugs found in
Ms. Harmon's home (R. 3). The count dismissed involved what
appeared to be prescription drugs in Ms. Harmon's purse (R. 3).
Ms. Harmon moved to suppress all of the State's evidence,
asserting her rights under Article I section 14 of the Utah
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution (R. 23-24, 30-74).
(R# 79-91).

The trial court denied this motion

Copies of the trial court's memorandum decision, and

findings and conclusions are in appendix 2.
Following the trial court's denial of her motion to
suppress, Ms. Harmon entered a conditional Sery plea to one third
degree felony count of possession of a controlled substance,
-2 -

explicitly reserving the right to appeal the trial court's denial of
her suppression motion (R. 95-101).

The trial court sentenced Ms.

Harmon to a zero to five year prison sentence and fined her $1,000
plus a 25% surcharge (R, 110). The court suspended the prison
sentence, placing Ms. Harmon on probation (R. Ill).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Detective Robbie Russo, Deputy for the Salt Lake County
Sheriff of almost eight years, was working in the Metro Narcotics
Strike Force on November 19, 1991. The purpose of the strike force
is enforcement of drug laws.

He went to Ms. Harmon's address, 2904

South 9100 West, because an informant had accused a Julie Harmon,
living at that address, of dealing in narcotics.

Russo refused to

identify the informant or elaborate on the details of their
relationship.

Russo's purpose in going to her home was to search

the home for drugs.

The confidential informant had performed no

controlled buys from Ms. Harmon.

Russo went to Ms. Harmon's home in

the early evening hours, just as she was pulling out of her driveway
in her car.

When she saw him drive up in his unmarked car, she

stopped her car and he approached her and identified himself as a
police officer.
narcotics —

He told her that she was suspected of dealing in

that it was rumored that she was a cocaine drug lord

and had all the drugs in Columbia in her house.
allegations.

She denied the

He requested her consent to search her home, and she

told him that he would have to wait until she returned from visiting
her father, who had had recently had a heart attack and was
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returning from the hospital that day.

He told her that he did not

have a search warrant, and would prefer to search her home before
she left to see her father.
wait until she returned.
to search at that time.

Again, she told him he would have to

It was clear that she would not allow him
During the conversation in her driveway,

Russo told her he would have to get a search warrant.

He never told

her what he admitted to at trial, that he did not have enough
evidence to obtain a search warrant.

R. 200-203, 219-221, 227-229.

Russo indicated that Ms. Harmon drove around the block a
couple of times within five minutes, and testified that he could
tell that she was concerned that he was at her home.

He ran a

warrants and driver's license check on her through dispatch.

He

then discovered that her driver's license was suspended, and called
for back-up.

He decided to arrest her for driving on suspension,

prior to stopping her.1

He followed her with another police car

containing two uniformed officers behind him, and she stopped two
blocks away from her home in a lot off the side of the road, across
the street from another officer in a separate car.

Russo confronted

Ms. Harmon about her driving on suspension, and she explained again
that she had needed to go see her father.
arrest for driving on suspension.

He placed her under

She began to cry and told him

1. In the trial court, it was repeatedly stated that
driving on suspension is a class B misdemeanor. E.g. R. 90. While
there are class B misdemeanor driving on suspensions, it appears
that under Utah Code Ann. section 41-2-136, Ms. Harmon was guilty of
a class C misdemeanor driving on suspension. Ms. Harmon testified
that her license was suspended when a friend was stopped while
driving one of Ms. Harmon's uninsured vehicles (R. 285).
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that he could not search her home, but would have to get a warrant.
R. 203-205, 232, 235, 246.
Upon arresting Ms. Harmon, Russo conducted what he called a
"search and seizure arrest.11 R. 206. He placed her in handcuffs,
placed her in his car, and looked through her purse and vehicle and
found vials of prescription drugs, one of which vials bore her name,
another of which vials had the label scratched off.

He indicated

that she had committed an offense involving the possession of
prescription drugs without the proper container, and indicated that
she also admitted that the pills were her mother7s or someone
else's.

He took the pills and the money from her purse.

Russo

placed her in his vehicle and informed her of her Miranda rights,
and the backup officer proceeded to impound her car.

R. 206-207,

233-234.
After he purportedly arrested her for the suspended license
and gave her her Miranda warnings, he told her that he knew she had
drugs in her home.

Russo testified that five minutes into their

journey on the way to the jail, Ms. Harmon told Russo that she was
afraid to let him search her home because she used to deal drugs,
and did not want him to find any residue of this past activity.

She

told him that she was concerned about her father, and may have told
him that she could not bail out of jail because Russo had
confiscated the money from her purse.

He testified that she then

told him that she wished to reform her lifestyle, and would allow
him to search her home.

He testified that it would be improper for

him to go search her home, because he had already placed her under
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arrest and did not wish to appear to be coercing her consent to the
search by having arrested her.

He testified that she told him there

would be no problem, and that she said that she would sign
anything.

It was clear to Russo that Ms. Harmon did not want to go

to jail and was upset at the prospect of having to do so.

He

testified that he told her he would just proceed to get a warrant,
but that she mentioned the names of other Metro Narcotics detectives
and convinced him that a warrant was unnecessary.

During the car

ride, Russo mentioned having to get a warrant for the second time,
despite his knowledge that he had insufficient probable cause for a
warrant.

He never told Ms. Harmon that he could not obtain a

warrant.

He testified that he was making her no promises and that

the search did not guarantee her release from custody.

At

approximately this point in the conversation, after they had driven
70 or 90 blocks, Detective Russo turned his car around to return to
her home.

He said that on the way back to her house, they discussed

the details of her prior drug deals.

He admitted that he told Ms.

Harmon on the way to the jail that he knew she had drugs, and he
admitted to having warned Ms. Harmon on the way to the jail that it
would be an unpleasant experience for her if he had to get a
warrant.

R. 207-210, 236-237, 249-251.
When they arrived at her house, Russo called for back-up,

repeated the Miranda warning, and gave her the consent form, which
she signed.

R. 211. A copy of the consent form is in evidence

(State's Exhibit 1), and in Appendix 3 to this brief.
states, in relevant part,
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The form

I, Julie Harmon, having been informed of my
rights per Miranda not to have a search made of
the premises, hereinafter mentioned, without a
Search Warrant, of my right to refuse to consent
to a search, hereby authorize; Det R Russo police
officer and his agent of the Metropolitan
Narcotics Strike Force to conduct a complete
search of my person, premise(s) and/or vehicle
at; 2904 S. 9100 W. These officers are
authorized by me to search and seize any
contraband or fruits of any crime while
conducting a search on a narcotics investigation.
This written permission is being given to me
to the above mentioned police officer voluntarily
and without threats or promises of any kind.
The majority of the blanks in the form were filled out by Russo.

R.

241.
The police approached her home, and had her secure her dog
so they would not have to shoot it in executing the search.

She put

her dog in the back yard and proceeded to show Russo where her drugs
and paraphernalia were.
own.

The detectives also found some on their

During the course of the search, she called her brother, a

deputy sheriff, who also spoke with Russo.

Detective Brenneman

testified that her demeanor during the search was friendly and
cordial.

R. 212-214, 253, 258.

At the conclusion of the search, Russo did not take Ms.
Harmon back to jail for driving on suspension or possession, but
elected to leave Ms. Harmon at home, with the understanding that she
would call him in the morning to discuss her willingness to work off
her charges doing under cover work.

While he denied bargaining with

her to trade her consent to the search for avoiding going to jail,
he admitted that once she gave him the drugs he was looking for, she
was not going to jail anymore.

R. 214-215.
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Julie Harmon testified that after she refused to consent to
the search of her home# Russo told her he could get a warrant and
refused to move so she could leave.

She told him he could search

after she returned from her parents', and that he then allowed her
to leave*

She testified that after she was stopped by the three

police cars, and after Russo asked her about the suspended license,
Russo requested her permission to search her car and then Russo
asked her if she would let him search her house, and she said no.
He then said, "Then, you are going to jail."

She asked him if he

would let her go if she consented to the search of her house, and he
said he would.

She testified that on the way to the jail, he told

her he knew she had drugs in her house, and told her he would get a
warrant and tear her house apart.

She asked if she could use the

$285 she had in her purse to bail out of jail, and he told her no.
She was crying and worried about what the additional stress from her
arrest would do to her father, and told Russo that he could have the
drugs belonging to someone else that were in her home.

She

testified that she first heard Russo on his radio informing the jail
that he was bringing in a female, and later heard him call the jail
to cancel the first call, informing the jail, "She's changed her
mind."

She said that when they got to her house, he told her that

he did not want to have to shoot her dog, and had her sign the
consent form prior to going to secure her dog.
without reading it first.

She signed it

She was cooperative during the search

because her brother is a policeman and because Russo had warned her
that they would rip her house apart.
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R. 277-290.

Russo never cited her for any traffic offense, nor did the
State charge her with any traffic offense (R. 164).
Russo testified that he had placed people under arrest for
driving on suspension several dozen times "counting citations and
custodial arrests," and then he clarified that he had performed
custodial arrests for driving on suspension maybe a dozen times. He
could not recall how many of those custodial arrests involved
DUIs.

R. 205-206, 233.
Detective Sterner testified that in three years, he had

arrested people for driving on suspension six or seven times, and
had given simple citations twenty to thirty times.

He indicated

that three or four of the custodial arrests involved DUIs.

It was

his general practice to handle driving on suspension with a
citation.

R. 268-269.
Detective Ben Anjewierden testified that at the time of Ms.

Harmon's arrest, as a result of a consent decree relating to jail
overcrowding, the jail's policy called for releasing without formal
booking of those charged solely with driving on suspension.
indicated that the policy was not mandatory.

He

R. 273, 276. The

trial court would not allow defense counsel to make a record of
whether Russo knew about the jail policy of releasing misdemeanants
such as Ms. Harmon without booking them, finding that under State v.
Lopez. 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App. 1992), the officer's intent was not
relevant.

R. 244.

The trial court found that the arrest for driving on
suspension was within Detective Russo's discretion, explicitly
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declining to consider Detective Russo's subjective intent, and
without applying the reasonable hypothetical officer test.

The

court then found that Ms. Harmon's consent to the search of her home
was voluntary.

R. 104-108, 243-244.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Driving on suspension is normally handled by citation
unless a DUI is involved.

Nonetheless, when Detective Russo

discovered Ms. Harmon's suspended driver's license, he decided to
arrest the rumored "drug lord" who allegedly had "all of the drugs
in Columbia" in her house.

He did in fact then execute what he

tellingly referred to as a "search and seizure arrest," finding what
appeared to be illegal prescription drugs on Ms. Harmon's person,
and later obtaining her consent to search her home where illegal
drugs were found.

Prior to obtaining her consent to search her

home, Russo was driving Ms. Harmon to the jail, purportedly for
driving on suspension.

Yet during the drive to the jail, he

informed her that he knew she had drugs and warned her that it would
be unpleasant if he had to resort to a warrant.

After Ms. Harmon

consented to the search of her home, Russo did not take her to jail
for driving on suspension or cite her for this offense, for which
she was never charged, but left her at her home, instructing her to
call him in the morning.
In failing to address the officer's unconstitutional
motivation and in failing to then apply the reasonable hypothetical
officer test, the trial court misapplied the law.
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The illegal

arrest requires the exclusion of all derivative evidence.
The major flaw in the trial court's consent analysis is her
failure to recognize the illegal arrest, and then assess whether the
State met its burden to show that the consent was not only
voluntary, but also independent from the illegality preceding the
consent.

The State cannot meet this burden on the facts of this

case, and reversal is necessary.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE STATE DID NOT MEET ITS BURDEN
TO SHOW THAT A REASONABLE HYPOTHETICAL OFFICER
WOULD HAVE ARRESTED MS. HARMON ABSENT
DETECTIVE RUSSO'S UNCONSTITUTIONAL MOTIVATION.
In State v. Lopez. 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App. 1990), the
majority of this Court maintained and clarified the pretext
doctrine.2

The trial court relied on Lopez during the hearing on

2. In Lopez. the State conceded the validity of the pretext
doctrine in the context of misdemeanor traffic arrests, stating,
[T]he State's argument that this Court should abandon
the pretext analysis adopted in Sierra is directed
only at traffic stops and does not extend to
misdemeanor traffic arrests. The State shares
defendant's concern that a misdemeanor traffic arrest
could be misused by a police officer as a pretext to
conduct a highly intrusive search of the arrested
person and his or her vehicle without reasonable
suspicion, probable cause, or a warrant. While an
officer appears to have the authority to arrest for a
misdemeanor traffic violation under Utah law, that
clearly is not the usual practice.
Reply brief of Appellee in State v. Lopez, Case No. 900484-CA, at 5
(footnote omitted).
Tellingly, in the trial court the prosecutor argued that
traffic stops and arrests are valid tools for officers to use in
investigating drug crimes and enforcing drug laws. T. 5/22/92 p. 57,
-11-

the motion to suppress, and cited and quoted Lopez in crafting her
memorandum decision, from which the prosecutor drafted the findings
of fact and conclusions of law.

The trial court's initial summary

of Lopez in her memorandum decision is accurate but incomplete.3

3. The trial court's memorandum decision, in Appendix 2,
states,
The Utah Court of Appeals recently clarified
what constitutes a "pretext stop" in the state of
Utah in State of Utah v. Lopez.
P.2d
(Utah
App. Decided May 5, 1992). Lopez reiterates the
well-established principal that under the Fourth
Amendment, the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures extends to automobiles.
Id.. at 3. "Thus, the Fourth Amendment prohibits
police officers from randomly or arbitrarily
stopping vehicles on the highway." Id. Lopez
then describes three situations in which an
officer is justified in stopping a vehicle
without a warrant:
(1) When the officer observes the driver
commit a traffic violation; (2) When the
officer has a reasonable articulable
suspicion that the driver is committing
a traffic offense, such as driving under
the influence of alcohol or driving
without a license; and (3) When the
officer has a reasonable articulable
suspicion that the driver is engaged in
more serious criminal activity, such as
transporting drugs.
Id. at 4, [citations o[]mitted].
Lopez articulates that the "pretext
doctrine" applies in two distinct situations.
First, it applies where the facts demonstrate the
driver did not commit a traffic violation. Under
such circumstances, the stop would almost always
be unconstitutional. This situation does not
exist in this case because it is undisputed that
a traffic violation was committed by Harmon.
Lopez, supra, at 6, Fn.7. The second situation is
[W]here the driver committed a minor
traffic violation or the vehicle had a
minor equipment problem, but where the
court concludes that a reasonable
(footnote continues)
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What is missing from the trial court's summary of Lopez.
and is also reflected in the trial court's ruling at the hearing ("I
disagree with that especially in light of the State vs. Lopez case.
The reasonable officer standard does not involve the intent of the
officer." R. 243), is the role of the officer's subjective intent in
the hypothetical reasonable officer test.

Under Lopez, the

officer's subjective intent is a fundamental part of the
hypothetical reasonable officer test: the unconstitutional or
illegal motivation.

See e.g. Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1047 (fl[T]he issue

of whether a traffic stop is a pretext stop cannot turn on the issue
of an officer's subjective intent, but rather, must turn on the
objective question of whether a reasonable officer would have made
the stop absent the illegal motivation.")(emphasis added and
deleted).
Because the trial court misperceived that Detective Russo's
subjective intent was not relevant at all, the trial court did not

(footnote 3 continued)
police officer [could have but] would
not have stopped the vehicle absent the
unconstitutional motivation.
Id. at 6 [emphasis added].
Lopez goes on to explain that
[t]he proper inquiry is whether a
reasonable officer would have stopped
the defendant solely for commission of
the traffic offense. . . . The proper
inquiry does not focus on whether the
officer could validly have made the
stop. . . . Further . . . the
officer's subjective motivation is not
the relevant inquiry.
Id., at 9-10 [emphasis in original].
(R. 84-85).
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recognize Russo's desire to investigate the "rumored drug lord" who
had "all the drugs in Columbia" in her house, when he decided to
arrest Ms. Harmon for a misdemeanor traffic offense and then
conducted a "search and seizure arrest."

Nor did the trial court

apply the reasonable hypothetical officer test.

Her memorandum

ruling demonstrates how she resolved the legal issue, stating,
The second issue raised by Harmon in
relation to this stop is that it was not
reasonable for Detective Russo to arrest her for
this offense. As to this issue, Detective Russo
had discretion whether to cite Harmon for this
traffic violation or to arrest her. The
testimony at the hearing was that officers in the
field occasionally arrest persons driving on a
suspended license, even if the driver does not
appear to be intoxicated. They routinely
exercise discretion as to whether they arrest the
offender or merely issue a citation. This
discretion exists in a multitude of situations in
which an individual may be subject to arrest,
bu[t] the officer decides not to take that
action. This discretion, which is inherent in
the work of the police officers, will not be
disturbed in this case in light of all the
circumstances. Moreover, it does not appear to
this Court that Detective Russo abused this
discretion.
Thus, it appears to this Court that a
reasonable officer would have stopped and
arrested this defendant; and therefore, Detective
Russo's actions were not based upon a pretextual
scheme, but upon his legal authority to stop
Harmon from committing a Class B misdemeanor:
namely, driving with a suspended license.
(R. 86-87).
The trial court's findings of fact similarly make no
mention of Russo's motivation to investigate Ms. Harmon's drug
involvement, but indicate that "Detective Russo had stopped and
arrested approximately 12 persons for driving on a suspended license
within the past year. . . . Officers routinely ex[]ercise
-14-

discretion as to whether they arrest for Driving on Suspension or
issue a citation."

(R. 106). The conclusions of law echo this

analysis, stating, "Police officers exercise discretion as to
whether they arrest the offender or issue a citation.

This

discretion was not abused by Detective Russo when he arrested Harmon
for Driving on Suspension." (R. 107).
While the trial court was likely correct that the evidence
before her demonstrated that a reasonable officer would have stopped
Ms. Harmon for driving on suspension, neither the evidence nor the
law support the conclusion that a reasonable hypothetical officer
would have arrested Ms. Harmon for the offense, absent Russo's
unconstitutional motivation to evade the warrant requirement.
Detective Russo testified that he had placed people under
arrest for driving on suspension several dozen times "counting
citations and custodial arrests," and then he clarified that he had
performed custodial arrests for driving on suspension in maybe a
dozen times.

He could not recall how many of those custodial

arrests involved DUIs.

R. 205-206, 233.

Detective Sterner

testified that in three years, he had arrested people for driving on
suspension six or seven times, and had given simple citations twenty
to thirty times.

He indicated that three or four of the custodial

arrests involved DUIs.

It was his general practice to handle

driving on suspension with a citation.

R. 268-269.

Detective

Anjewierden testified that at the time of Ms. Harmon's arrest, as a
result of a consent decree relating to jail overcrowding, the jail's
policy called for releasing without formal booking of those charged
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solely with driving on suspension.
not mandatory.

He indicated that the policy was

R. 273, 276.

The trial court ruled that under State v. Lopez. 831 P.2d
1040 (Utah App. 1992), Detective Russo's intent was not relevant,
and refused trial counsel's efforts to make a record of Russo's
knowledge of the jail's no-booking release policy.

R. 244.

However, the record demonstrates that Russo would not have arrested
Ms. Harmon for driving on suspension absent his desire to
investigate his drug suspicions.

While Russo initially arrested Ms.

Harmon for driving on suspension, once he got what he wanted (full
search of her person, car and home without a warrant), he did not
take her to jail, or even issue a citation for driving on suspension.
As trial counsel argued to the trial court, the law does
not permit a police officer to evade the warrant requirements of the
State and Federal Constitutions by arresting traffic misdemeanants
(R. 33, 152). In State v. Parker. 834 P.2d 592 (Utah App. 1992),
the police wished to investigate Mr. Parker for a burglary.

Upon

witnessing Mr. Parker speeding twenty miles over the limit in a
residential section into a driveway where he stopped, a police
officer ordered Mr. Parker from his car at gunpoint, handcuffed him
and arrested him.

Id. at 593. Reasoning that "a traffic stop is a

limited seizure and is more like an investigative dentention than a
custodial arrest," this Court assessed the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness of the officer's conduct under the two pronged test
of Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968):
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(1) Was the officer's action justified at its
inception?, and (2) Was his action reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place?
Parker at 594.

In Parker, as in the instant case, the officer's

decision to stop the traffic misdemeanant was objectively
reasonable.

See id. at 594. However, the scope of the officers'

conduct in both cases went far beyond the circumstances that
justified the initial stop.

In both cases, rather than issuing a

traffic citation and allowing the drivers to proceed on their way
(Ms. Harmon was approximately two blocks from her home, within easy
walking distance), the officers arrested the drivers.

See id. at

594-95 and n.l (recognizing statutory discretion to arrest for
misdemeanor traffic violations, but noting that for purposes of
Fourth Amendment analysis, traffic stops must be accomplished
through the least intrusive means).

Just as the officer in Parker

had no reasonable articulable suspicion to justify detaining Mr.
Parker for the burglary, id. at 595, Detective Russo had no
reasonable articulable suspicion to detain Ms. Harmon for suspicion
of trafficking in drugs.

Detective Russo's wholly unsubstantiated

statement from a confidential informant that Julie Harmon was
dealing illegal drugs does not meet the constitutional standard of a
reasonable articulable suspicion, and certainly does not provide the
probable cause required for her warrantless arrest.

See e.g. State

v. Svkes. 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah 1992)(discussing what does and
does not constitute a reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking);
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964)(explaining probable cause for
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arrest; holding that warrantless seizure and search of Mr. Beck,
disclosing illegal clearinghouse slips, could not be justified as a
valid search incident to arrest on basis of officer's testimony that
the officer had a photograph of Mr. Beck and knew what he looked
like, knew of his prior record for similar violations, and had
received unspecified "information" and "reports" from unidentified
sources); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110
L.Ed.2d 301 (1990)(officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Ms.
White on the basis of an anonymous tip, the details of which
accurately predicted her future behavior, indicating the anonymous
informer's unique knowledge of Ms. White); Draper v. United States.
358 U.S. 307 (1959)(probable cause to arrest justified by reliance
on known informer who had proved reliable over a period of six
months, when arresting officer received and personally verified
numerous details provided by the informer).
The trial court's ruling that Detective Russo's arrest of
Ms. Harmon was within his discretion was incorrect.

There is no

evidence that at the time of Ms. Harmon's arrest, when there were
three police cars and at least four police officers present, she
posed any threat of violence or escape.

Nor was there a reasonable

suspicion or probable cause of drug trafficking to justify her
arrest.

Cf. Parker at 595 ("After witnessing Parker speed into his

grandmother's driveway, Corporal Naylor pulled his vehicle behind
Parker's unholstered his gun, removed Parker from his vehicle,
handcuffed him, and placed him under arrest.

There is no evidence

that Parker was making any attempt at escape; to the contrary, the
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vehicle was in neutral and pointed toward the garage.

At this

point, Corporal Naylor had no reasonable articulable suspicion that
Parker had committed or was about to commit a crime.

Under the

circumstances present here, it is patently offensive to suggest that
a police officer acting as Corporal Naylor did here was within the
realm of discretion granted to police officers under the law.").
See also State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah App.
1992)("Allowing police officers to stop vehicles for any minor
violation when the officer in fact is pursuing a hunch would allow
officers to seize almost any individual on the basis of otherwise
unconstitutional objectives.

Such unfettered discretion offends the

Fourth Amendment.")(citations omitted); United States v. Walker, 933
F.2d 812, 816 n.l (10th Cir. 1991), cert, denied. 112 S.Ct. 1168,
117 L.Ed.2d 414 ("[I]t appears that Utah law does not allow an
officer in these circumstances to make a custodial arrest for a
speeding violation.

See Utah Code Ann. §77-7-18 et seq.").

In addition to reversing the trial court's ruling that the
arrest was legal, this Court may wish to consider an independent
ruling under Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution that the
officer's subjective intent is a relevant consideration in the
assessment of the reasonableness of an officer's conduct.

Trial

counsel's motions to suppress invoked Ms. Harmon's rights under
Article I section 14 (R. 23-24, 31-32).

Trial counsel argued in

writing that the protections of Article I section 14 are broader
than those of the fourth amendment, citing State v. Larocco, 794
P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), and citing and attaching a copy of
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K. Wallentine, "Heeding the Call: Search and Seizure Jurisprudence
Under the Utah Constitution, Article I section 14." (R. 33-64).

At

the hearing on the motion, trial counsel reiterated this history of
the state and constitution, and argued specifically that under
Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution, intent should be a
relevant factor in this case (R. 145-150, 243). The trial court
declined to rule on independent state constitutional grounds (R. 80,
108) .
The unique history of this state justifies broad protection
of Article I section 14 rights.

See R. 33-64.

An additional basis

for adopting the Utah Constitutional ruling sought by trial counsel
is that federal law on the role of an officer's subjective intent in
search and seizure cases is confusing.

See State v. Larocco. 794

P.2d 460, 469 (Utah 1990)(main opinion makes independent Utah
constitutional law under Article I section 14 because search and
seizure law has grown confusing and unworkable in the federal
courts).
The federal rule is that courts must assess the
reasonableness of police conduct objectively.

E.g. Scott v. United

States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978)("[A]lmost without exception in
evaluating alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment the Court has
first undertaken an objective assessment of an officer's actions in
light of the facts and circumstances then known to him."). 4

4. It is arguable that the objectivity rule in Scott is
dicta, see Burkoff, "The Pretext Search Doctrine Returns After Never
Leaving," 66 U. Detroit L.Rev. 363, 366-368 (1989); Burkoff, "Bad
(footnote continues)
-20-

Unfortunately, many courts, like the trial court in this
case, misperceive that an "objective" assessment must exclude
consideration of an officer's subjective intent.

As the court

explained in United States v. Guzman. 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir.
1988), such a misunderstanding of the objective test in pretext
cases hinders the goal of limiting excessive police discretion.
It is the need to restrain the arbitrary exercise
of discretionary police power that has been the
driving force behind the Court's decisions
forbidding police practices not amenable to
objective review. Brown v. Texas. 443 U.S. 47,
52, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 61 L.Ed.2d 357
(1979)("When ... a stop is not based on objective
criteria, the risk of arbitrary and abusive
police practices exceeds tolerable limits.");
Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648 661, 99 S.Ct.
1391, 1400, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)("[S]tandardless
and unconstrained discretion is the evil the
Court has discerned when in previous cases it has
insisted that the discretion of the official in
the field be circumscribed"). Determining the
constitutionality of intrusions by the
prosecution's ability to justify them under some
set of objective circumstances would undermine
the Court's concern with limiting unreviewable
discretion in the name of the objective test
designed to safeguard that concern.
Id. at 1516.

See also United States v. Keller. 499 F.Supp. 415, 417

(footnote 4 continued)
Faith Searches," 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 70, 83-84 (1982); Burkoff, "The
Pretext Search Doctrine: Now You See It, Now You Don't," 17
U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 523 (1984); and that the legal underpinnings of that
dicta are wanting, see LaFave Search and Seizure, section 1.4, pages
81-83; A. Eisemann Note, 63 B.U.L.Rev. 223, 242-244 (1983); Burkoff,
"Bad Faith Searches," 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 70 (1982).
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(N.D. 111. 1980)("If every arrest were judged by an objective
standard and upheld if there was a valid basis for arrest, then
there could never be a pretextual arrest.

The concept assumes that

there is a basis for an arrest, but that the arrest is made for the
purpose of conducting a search for which there would not otherwise
be a justification.

Although proving subjective motives is

unquestionably problematic, to judge an arrest by an objective
standard ignores, instead of solves, the problem.")(citation
omitted).
Under Scott, the subjective intent of the officer is
pertinent to evaluating the police officer's credibility, and in
determining whether exclusion of evidence is an appropriate remedy.
The Scott Court stated,
This is not to say, of course, that the
question of motive plays absolutely no part in
the suppression inquiry. On occasion, the motive
with which the officer conducts an illegal search
may have some relevance in determining the
propriety of applying the exclusionary rule. For
example, in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,
458, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046, 96 S.Ct. 3021 (1976), we
ruled that evidence unconstitutionally seized by
state police could be introduced in federal civil
tax proceedings because "the imposition of the
exclusionary rule . . . is unlikely to provide
significant, much less substantial, additional
deterrence. It falls outside the offending
officer'& zone of primary interest." See also
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268,
276-277, 55 L.Ed.2d 268, 98 S.Ct. 1054 (1978).
This focus on intent, however, becomes relevant
only after it has been determined that the
Constitution was in fact violated. We also have
little doubt that as a practical matter the
judge's assessment of the motives of the officers
may occasionally influence his judgment regarding
the credibility of the officers' claims with
respect to what information was or was not
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available to them at the time of the incident in
question. But the assessment and use of motive
in this limited manner is irrelevant to our
analysis of the questions at issue in this case.
436 U.S. 128, 139 n. 13.

Several cases following Scott recognize

that the subjective intent of police officers is a relevant factor
to be considered.

E.g. United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 501

n.3 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Causev. 834 F.2d 1179, 1182 n.
7 (5th Cir. 1987).
The United States Supreme Court has been inconsistent in
its application of the objectivity rule,5 and its application of a
two-step violation/exclusion Fourth Amendment effectively defeats
Fourth Amendment challenges and remedies.6

5. For cases examining subjective intent, see e.g. Jones v.
United States. 357 U.S. 493, 500 (1958); Abel v. United States, 362
U.S. 217, 226, 230 (I960); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 42-43
(1963); South Dakota v. Qpperman. 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976); Colorado
v. Bannister. 449 U.S. 1, 4 n.4 (1980)(per curiam); Steagald v.
United States. 451 U.S. 204, 215 (1981); Michigan v. Clifford, 464
U.S. 287, 292 (1984)(plurality opinion); Colorado v. Bertine, 479
U.S. 367, 371, 372 (1987); Maryland v. Garrison. 480 U.S. 79, 85, 87
(1987); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 729 (1987)(plurality
opinion). See also Burkoff, "Bad Faith Searches," 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev.
70, 75-83 (1982); Burkoff, "The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now You See
It, Now You Don't," 17 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 523, 544-548 (1984); A.
Eisemann Note, 63 B.U.L.Rev. 223, 242-244 (1983).
For cases citing the objectivity rule and ignoring the
subjective intent, see e.g. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462
U.S. 579, 584 n.3 (1983); Maryland v. Macon. 472 U.S. 463, 471
(1985). See also Burkoff, "The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now You See
It, Now You Don't," 17 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 523, 524-525, 528-532 (1984).
6. For criticism of this two-step approach, see Burkoff,
"The Court that Swallowed the Fourth Amendment," 58 Ore.L.Rev. 151,
187-190 (1979).
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This Court should act under the Utah Constitution and
vitalize the pretext doctrine by recognizing that the subjective
intent of the officer is relevant, and may be proved by traditional
objective evidence, or by the officer's direct testimony on his
subjective intent.

Such an approach would be consistent with State

v, Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), wherein the court explicitly
held that under the Utah Constitution, "exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police violations of
article I section 14." Id. at 472 (emphasis added).

Under the

federal Fourth Amendment Scott decision, the subjective intent of
the officer is not entirely irrelevant, but is pertinent to
determining whether exclusion of evidence is an appropriate remedy.
United States v. Scott, 436 U.S. 128, 139 n. 13.

Because exclusion

of evidence is a necessary consequence of an Article I section 14
violation under Larocco, the Scott rule, limiting the relevance of
the officer's subjective intent to the exclusion question, does not
apply.
In sum, because the State failed to meet its burden to show
that a reasonable hypothetical officer would have arrested Ms.
Harmon absent Detective Russo's illegal motivation, all evidence
derived from the warrantless arrest must be excluded.

See State v.

Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1049 (Utah App. 1992)(the State carries the
ultimate burden of proof in pretext cases).

-24-

II.
THE STATE DID NOT MEET ITS BURDEN TO SHOW
THAT MS. HARMON'S CONSENT WAS VOLUNTARY AND
PURGED OF THE TAINT OF THE ILLEGAL ARREST.
The State's burden in attempting to justify warrantless
searches and seizures with consent is described in State v. Robinson
and Towers. 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990), as follows:
Two factors determine whether consent to a search
is lawfully obtained following police action that
violates the fourth amendment, such as the
unlawful detention here: (1) the consent must be
voluntary in fact; and (2) the consent must not
be obtained by police exploitation of the prior
illegality. Both tests must be met in order for
evidence obtained in searches following police
illegality to be admissible.
Whether a consent to a search was in fact
voluntary
or was the product of duress or
coercion, express or implied, is a
question of fact to be determined from
the totality of all the circumstances.
While knowledge of the right to refuse
consent is one factor to be taken into
account, the government need not
establish such knowledge as the sine
qua non of an effective consent.
In examining all the surrounding
circumstances to determine if in fact the
consent to search was coerced, a court must
take into account both the details of police
conduct and the characteristics of the
accused, which include "subtly coercive
police questions, as well as the possibly
vulnerable subjective state of the person
who consents." It is the State's burden to
prove that a consent to search was
voluntary*
....

As the Utah Supreme Court recently
stressed, a prosecutor attempting to prove
voluntary consent after illegal police
action "'has a much heavier burden to
satisfy than when proving consent to search7
which does not follow police misconduct.
797 P.2d at 437 and n.7 (citations omitted).
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Because the trial court failed to appreciate the fact that
Ms. Harmon's arrest was illegal, the trial court did not assess
whether the State met its burden to show that Ms. Harmon's consent
was not only voluntary, but also was purged of the taint of the
illegal arrest.

A. THE CONSENT WAS TAINTED BY THE ILLEGAL ARREST.
This Court has recognized that consents that appear to be
wholly voluntary are nonetheless inadequate to justify warrantless
searches if the consents are not sufficiently attenuated from
preceding police illegalities.

E.g. State v. Small, 829 P.2d 129,

132 (Utah App. 1992)(addressing the issue in original appellate
findings, this Court found no evidence that the consent was
involuntary, but reversed denial of suppression ruling because
consent was tainted by illegal roadblock).

In fact, this Court need

not even address whether the search was voluntary if this Court
agrees that the State has failed to demonstrate that the consent was
purged of the taint of the illegal stop and detention.

State v.

Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 656 (Utah App. 1992).
As the court explained in State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684
(Utah 1990),
The basis for the second part of the
two-part analysis is found in the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine of Wong Sun v. United
States. 371 U.S. 471 (1963), which stated that a
trial court must determine in such a case
•"whether, granting establishment of the primary
illegality, the evidence to which instant
objection is made has been come at by
exploitation of that illegality or instead of
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means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged
of the primary taint.'" 371 U.S. at 488 (quoting
Maguire# Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959). The
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine has been
extended to invalidate consents which, despite
being voluntary, are nonetheless the exploitation
of a prior police illegality.
Id. at 690.
The court further explained the factors to be considered in
determining whether the State has met its burden of demonstrating
that the consent was not tainted by preceding illegality: whether
warnings of rights were given, the temporal proximity of the
illegality and the consent, intervening circumstances,7 and the
purpose and flagracy of the illegality.

Id. at 690-691 n.4.

The pertinent facts and circumstances demonstrate that the
State cannot meet its burden of proving that the consent was
separate from, rather than a product of and/or tainted by the
preceding illegalities.

The encounter between Ms. Harmon and

Detective Russo began in the evening, when he drove up to her house
in an unmarked car, identified himself as a police officer, and
accused her of being a rumored "drug lord" and of having "all the
drugs in Columbia" in her house.

She did not consent to the search

of her home at that time.
When Ms. Harmon next encountered the detective, she was
stopped in a parking lot by three separate police cars, frisked and

7. For examples of
Juarez v. State, 758 S.W.2d
was allowed to consult with
State, 741 S.W.2d 414 (Tex.
admonished that his consent

intervening circumstances, see e.g.
772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)(the defendant
his companion in his car); Reves v.
Crim. App. 1987)(the defendant was
was not mandated).
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handcuffed.

Detective Russo found incriminating evidence

—

prescription drugs belonging to other people, and a prescription
bottle with the label scratched off in her purse.
When she was arrested, Ms. Harmon was crying, and again
informed Detective Russo that he could not search her home without a
warrant.
Russo confiscated her bail money and began driving her
alone with him in his unmarked car to the jail.

While he

purportedly was arresting her for driving on suspension, he told her
on the way to the jail that he knew she had drugs, and that it would
be unpleasant if he had to get a warrant.

After driving some 70 or

90 blocks with him, Julie Harmon finally agreed that he could search
her home.

When they arrived there, Detective Russo had her sign the

nonsensical consent form, a copy of which is in Appendix 3 to this
brief.

During this time, Ms. Harmon was concerned about the stress

that her arrest would place on her father, who had just returned
from the hospital, having suffered a heart attack.

Detective Russo

told her that it would be unpleasant if he had to get a warrant, and
mentioned the possibility that her dog would be shot, allowing her
to precede the police into her home to secure the dog.
While Russo steadfastly denied that he bargained with Ms.
Harmon for her consent to the search in exchange for his not taking
her to jail for driving on suspension, the record demonstrates that
once Russo obtained the consent that she had previously denied him
twice, he did not take her to jail, or even cite her for driving on
suspension.
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Ms. Harmon's consent was inextricably intertwined with the
illegal arrest.

B. THE CONSENT WAS NOT VOLUNTARY.
To show voluntary consent, the State must carry this burden
of proof:
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony
that the consent was "unequivocal and specific11
and "freely and intelligently given11;
(2) the government must prove consent was given
without duress or coercion, express or implied;
and
(3) the courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against the waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and there must be
convincing evidence that such rights were waived.
State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990)(citations omitted).
Ms. Harmon's consent cannot be considered clear and
specific, inasmuch as it is memorialized in the garbled consent form
in Appendix 3.
More importantly, the consent cannot be considered freely
given, for it was a product of coercion and duress.

A lack of

coercion may be shown by the following:
1) absence of a claim of authority to search by
the officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of
force by the officers; 3) a mere request to
search; 4) cooperation by the owner ...; and 5)
the absence of deception or trick on the part of
the officer.
State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980).
Here, Detective Russo at least twice mentioned that he
would have to get a warrant if Ms. Harmon would not consent, despite
the fact that he knew he could obtain no such warrant.
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Rather than

honestly telling Ms. Harmon that he could not obtain a warrant, or
simply refraining from mentioning a warrant, Russo implied that he
could obtain a warrant.

Russo was very forceful, and Ms. Harmon was

especially susceptible to his force.

It was Russo who first

mentioned the possibility that the police might shoot Ms. Harmon's
dog during the course of the search, and the State presented no
evidence disputing Ms. Harmon's testimony that she was under strain
because her father had just returned home from the hospital
following a heart attack.

Inasmuch as Ms. Harmon's brother is a

deputy sheriff, it is safe to assume that the State could easily
have presented any evidence to impeach her on the strain she was
suffering from this family circumstance, had such evidence existed.
In his purported zeal to enforce the traffic code prohibiting
driving on suspension as a class C misdemeanor, Russo summoned two
additional police cars containing at least three other officers, to
surround Ms. Harmon's car.

He handcuffed her, frisked her, went

through her purse, confiscated her bail money and apparently illegal
prescription drugs, informed her of her Miranda rights, and put her
in the police car.

Shortly thereafter, on the way to the jail,

rather than discussing the evils of driving on suspension, he again
informed her that he knew she had drugs in her home, and warned her
that it would be unpleasant if he had to get a warrant.

At the time

he made these statements, Ms. Harmon had refused to consent to the
search of her home at least twice.

While Russo contradicted Ms.

Harmon's testimony that her consent to search was exchanged for his
promise to take her home and not to the jail, the facts on the
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record remain.

Once Russo obtained without a warrant during the

"search and seizure arrest" the evidence against the rumored drug
lord (although perhaps a bit less than all the drugs in Columbia),
he did not incarcerate or even cite Ms. Harmon for driving on
suspension.
These facts demonstrate far less freedom and far more
coercion than existed in State v. Robinson and Towers. 797 P.2d 431
(Utah App. 1990), in which this Court determined for the first time
on appeal that the consent given was not voluntary, stating,
Here, the defendants were first questioned
about their right to possession of the van during
the brief, initially valid traffic stop. Once
the legal basis for that stop had ended, after a
short period of detention, they were nonetheless
not free to leave. They were detained and
questioned about matters other than the traffic
violation on the side of the interstate by two
armed police officers with apparent, though
false, authority to do so, then ordered by one
trooper to remain at the van and await his
return. They complied with his commands. Next,
they were questioned about whether they were
carrying any contraband and asked to consent to a
search of the vehicle. There is no evidence that
Robinson was aware or was informed that he did
not have to accede to the trooper's request. At
that time, it was apparent that the defendants
would be kept in that custodial environment until
the troopers satisfied their curiosity about the
contents of the van, particularly the area under
the bed. In light of the troopers' questioning
and conduct, the coercive atmosphere at the time,
and the other surrounding circumstances, we
conclude that the State has not borne its burden
of proving that Robinson's consent to search the
vehicle was voluntary.
Id. at 10.
In short, in this case, as in Robinson and Towers, the
prosecution did not meet its burden of proving voluntary consent.

-31-

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the trial court's denial of Ms.
Harmon's motion to suppress.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of D e c , 1992.

MARtf R." MOFF$F
Attorney forLMs. Harmon
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APPENDIX 1
Statutes and Constitutional Provisions

TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS

Article I# Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person and
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof,
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in
his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases.
In no instance shall any accused person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbiddenIssuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States provides:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.

Amendment V to the Constitution of the United States provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.
Amendment XIV to the Constitution of the United States provides:
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2.
Representatives shall be apportioned among
the several States according to their respective
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But
when the right to vote at any election for the
choice of electors for President and
Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and
Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of
the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the
male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one
years of age, and citizens of the United States,
or in any way abridged, except for participation
in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in the
proportion which the number of such male citizens
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.

Section 3.
No person shall be a Senator or
Representative in Congress, or elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office,
civil or military, under the United States, or
under any State, who, having previously taken an
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer
of the United States, or as a member of any State
legislature or as an executive or judicial
officer of any State, to support the Constitution
of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same or
given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each
House, remove such disability.
Section 4.
The validity of the public debt of the
United States, authorized by law, including debts
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for
services in suppressing insurrection or
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither
the United States nor any State shall assume or
pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of
insurrection or rebellion against the United
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation
of any slave; but all such debts, obligations,
and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5.
The Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article.
Utah Code Ann. section 41-2-136 (1992 Cum. Supp.) provides:
41-2-136. Operating vehicle prohibited while
license denied, suspended, disqualified, or
revoked—Penalties•
(1) A person whose license has been denied,
suspended, disqualified, or revoked under this
chapter or under the laws of the state in which
his license was issued and who operates any motor
vehicle upon the highways of this state while
that license is denied, suspended, disqualified,
or revoked shall be punished as provided in this
section.
(2) A person convicted of a violation of
Subsection (1), other than a violation specified
in Subsection (3), is guilty of a class C
misdemeanor.

(3) (a) A person is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor whose conviction under
Subsection (1) is based on his operating a
vehicle while his license is suspended,
disqualified, or revoked for:
(i) a refusal to submit to a
chemical test under Section 41-6-44.10;
(ii) a violation of Section
41-6-44;
(iii) a violation of a local
ordinance that complies with the
requirements of Section 41-6-43;
(iv) a violation of Section
76-5-207;
(v) a criminal action that the
person plead guilty to as a result of a
plea bargain after having been
originally charged with violating one
or more of the sections or ordinances
under this subsection;
(vi) a revocation or suspension
which has been extended under
Subsection 41-2-127(2); or
(vii) where disqualification is
the result of driving a commercial
motor vehicle while the person's CDL is
disqualified, suspended, canceled, or
revoked under Subsection 41-2-715(1).
(b) A person is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor whose conviction under
Subsection (1) is based upon his operating a
vehicle while his license is suspended,
disqualified, or revoked in his state of
licensure for violations corresponding to
the violations listed in Subsection (a).
(c) A fine imposed under this
subsection shall be at least the maximum
fine for a class C misdemeanor under Section
76-3-301.
Utah Code Ann. section 77-7-2 (1990 Repl. Vol.) provides:
77-7-2. By peace officers.
A peace officer may make an arrest under
authority of a warrant or may, without warrant,
arrest a person:
(1) for any public offense committed or
attempted in the presence of any peace
officer; "presence" includes all of the
physical senses or any device that enhances
the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any

physical sense, or records the observations
of any of the physical senses;
(2) when he has a reasonable cause to
believe a felony has been committed and has
reasonable cause to believe that the person
arrested has committed it;
(3) when he has reasonable cause to
believe the person has committed a public
offense, and there is reasonable cause for
believing the person may:
(a) flee or conceal himself to
avoid arrest;
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of
the commission of the offense; or
(c) injure another person or
damage property belonging to another
person.
Utah Code Ann. section 77-7-18 (1992 Cum. Supp.) provides:
77-7-18. Citation on misdemeanor or infraction
charge.
A peace officer, in lieu of taking a person
into custody, or any public official of any
county or municipality charged with the
enforcement of the law, may issue and deliver a
citation requiring any person subject to arrest
or prosecution on a misdemeanor or infraction
charge to appear at the court of the magistrate
before whom the person should be taken pursuant
to law if the person had been arrested.

APPENDIX 2
Trial Court's Memorandum Decision and
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO.

921900308

vs.
JULIE HARMON,
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant
to defendant Julie Harmon's Motion to Suppress various evidence
obtained by the prosecution.
suppress

incriminating

police

officer and

search

of her

Specifically, defendant seeks to

statements

she

made

to

an

arresting

illegal drugs that were discovered

residence

on November

19,

1991.

in a

Based

upon

defendant's motion, the memoranda of both parties, the evidence
at the suppression hearing, the arguments of counsel, and for
good

cause appearing,

the Court hereby enters the following

ruling.
Defendant

Harmon

claims she was

illegally

stopped

on a

pretext by a police officer in Salt Lake County in violation of
her constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches

pftp *? n
L U \J i J
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and
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as guaranteed

by the
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Fourth

Amendment

to the

United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the
Utah

Constitution.

Harmon

also

alleges

that

Detective

Russo illegally obtained her written consent to search her home
by

placing

violations,

her

under

Harmon

duress.

seeks

to

Based

suppress

on

these

any

two

evidence

alleged
obtained

following her arrest and the subsequent search of her home.
The underlying facts relevant to this motion are that on or
about

November

19,

1991,

Detective

Robbie

Russo,

a

deputy

county sheriff with the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office on
assignment

to

telephone

tip

the
from

Metro
an

Narcotics

Task

Force,

received

informant

that

Julie

Harmon

a
was

distributing narcotics at a single family dwelling located at
2904 South 9100 West in Salt Lake County.

At approximately

6:00 p.m. that evening, Detective Russo went to that address to
conduct a "knock and talk," which means that the officer went to

1

Harmon argues that Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution should be interpreted more restrictively than the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, but the
Court is not persuaded by this view under the facts presented
in this case.

n r\ A r n
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the address with the intention to walk up to the door, knock
and ask for information to confirm or rebut the allegations in
the telephone complaint.
When Detective Russo arrived at the residence, he observed
a person he later identified as Julie Harmon was in her car
beginning

to

back

out

of

the

driveway

of

the

residence.

Detective Russo approached Harmon, told her he had received a
complaint that she was distributing narcotics and asked if he
could search her house.

She refused, stating that her father,

who had recently suffered a heart attack, was due to return
home from the hospital and that she was on her way to visit
him.
that

According to Detective Russo, she then told Russo twice
he could

search her home when she returned.

At the

suppression hearing, however, Harmon disputed this testimony.
Following this conversation, Harmon drove to her parent's
home.

Detective Russo, sitting in his patrol car in front of

the house, called to check on Harmon's driver's license and was
informed that her license was suspended.
Harmon returned

Shortly thereafter,

to her home and drove around the block two

times, evidently to observe what Detective Russo was doing.
Detective Russo called in a marked patrol car to assist him in

r r\ f\ r -?
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stopping her for driving on a suspended

license.

Detective

Russo and a uniformed police officer then stopped Harmon in a
parking lot near her home.
driving on a suspension.

Harmon was placed under arrest for
Detective Russo placed her in his

unmarked vehicle, read Harmon her Miranda rights and proceeded
to take her to the Salt Lake County Jail.
According

to

Detective

Russo,

on the way

to

the jail,

post-Miranda, Harmon admitted to Detective Russo that she had
been afraid to let him into her residence because at one time
she had sold drugs and the house contained drug paraphernalia,
but that she was trying to clean up her act.

According to

Detective Russo, Harmon told him that if he drove her back to
her house, she would let him in so that he could retrieve those
items.
sign

According

a consent

to Detective Russo, Harmon

form

permitting

a search of her home, and that

Harmon

to

jail

again told

not

anyway.

promise

house.

that

go

did

search her

testified

probably

he

to

said she would

her

According

Detective
any

to

benefit

she would

Russo
for
still

Detective Russo,

Detective Russo she would

consent to the

search of her home and at that point Detective Russo turned his
car around and drove back to Harmon's house.
called

in for assistance to search her home.

On the way, he
Upon arriving

p r\ n r o
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back at Harmon's home and before exiting the vehicle, Harmon
was Mirandized again and she then signed a written consent to
search her home.
Having

obtained

Harmon's

written

consent

to

search,

Detective Russo, together with some uniformed officers who had
arrived

on the scene, then proceeded

inside, at which time

Harmon pulled various items of drug paraphernalia and illegal
2
drugs out from underneath a sofa in the living room.

During

the search of the home, Harmon was permitted to telephone her
brother, who she testified is himself a police officer and who
was then at her parent's home.

This call was made by Harmon to

seek her brother's advice about what she should do under the
circumstances.
Defendant Harmon's contention is that the traffic stop was
made under the pretext of a lawful stop, but that the real
reason for stopping her was to obtain her consent to search her
house through coercive means.

Based upon this premise, Harmon

argues that Russo's actions amounted to an unlawful "pretext
stop."
2
Thedrugs were subsequently identified as marijuana
and methamphetamines.
Additional testimony was presented
pertaining to other controlled substances in the possession of
Harmon at the time of her arrest, but the Court has not
considered them in the context of this motion to suppress.
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Court
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Appeals

recently

clarified

constitutes a "pretext stop" in the state of Utah in
Utah v. Lopez,

P.2d

(Utah App. Decided May

what

State of
5, 1992).

Lopez reiterates the well-established principal that under the
Fourth

Amendment,

searches
"Thus,

the

randomly
Id.

and

the

seizures

Fourth

right

to

extends

Amendment

or arbitrarily

be

to

free

from

unreasonable

automobiles.

prohibits

police

Id,,

at

officers

3.

from

stopping vehicles on the highway."

Lopez then describes three situations in which an officer

is justified in stopping a vehicle without a warrant:
(1) When the officer observes the driver commit
a traffic violation; (2) When the officer has a
reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver
is committing a traffic offense, such as driving
under the influence of alcohol or driving without
a license; and (3) When the officer has a
reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver
is engaged in more serious criminal activity,
such as transporting drugs.
Id., at 4, [citations ommitted].
Lopez articulates that the "pretext doctrine" applies in
two distinct

situations.

demonstrate

the

Under

circumstances,

such

First,

driver did

not
the

it applies where the facts
commit

stop

a traffic

would

almost

violation.
always

be

r r\ A o A
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This situation does nut. exist

in this case

because it is undisputed that a traffic violation was committed
by Harmon.

Lopez, supra, at 6, Fn.7. The second situation is

[w]here the driver committed a minor traffic
violation or the vehicle had a minor equipment
problem, but where the court concludes that a
reasonable police officer [could have but] would
not
have
stopped
the
vehicle
absent
the
unconstitutional motivation.
Id,, at 6 [emphasis added].
Lopez goes on to explain that
[t]he proper inquiry is whether a reasonable
officer would have stopped the defendant solely
for commission of the traffic offense. . . . The
proper inquiry does not focus on whether the
officer could validly have made the stop. . . .
Further. . . the officer's subjective motivation
is not the relevant inquiry.
Id.. at 9-10 [emphasis in original].
In the instant case, Harmon was stopped due to a traffic
violation:

namely, driving with a suspended license.

Until

Detective Russo learned that Harmon had a suspended license, he
made no effort to stop her; and in fact, Harmon drove away from
him.

Detective Russo certainly was authorized to enforce the

law to stop someone known by him to be driving on a suspended
license.

Moreover, driving on a suspended license is a Class B

Misdemeanor in the State of Utah, and Detective Russo testified
that he himself within the last year had made approximately 12

C r> 0 o
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stops for driving on a suspended license.

The mere fact that

Russo was assigned to the Metro Narcotics Strike Force instead
of performing traffic duty does not render him less authorized
to intervene if he has knowledge
suspended license.

that someone is driving on a

It is the opinion of this Court, therefore,

that a reasonable officer would have stopped Harmon for driving
on a suspended license.
The second issue raised by Harmon in relation to this stop
is that it was not reasonable for Detective Russo to arrest her
for

this

offense.

As

to

this

issue,

Detective

Russo

had

discretion whether to cite Harmon for this traffic violation or
to arrest her.

The testimony at the hearing was that officers

in the field occasionally arrest persons driving on a suspended
license, even if the driver does not appear to be intoxicated.
They routinely exercise discretion as to whether they arrest
the

offender

or

merely

issue

a

citation.

This

discretion

exists in a multitude of situations in which an individual may
be subject to arrest, bu the officer decides not to take that
action.

This discretion, which

is inherent

in the work of

police officers, will not be disturbed in this case in light of
all of the circumstances.

Moreover, it does not appear to this

Court that Detective Russo abused this discretion.

roo
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Thus, it appears tu t h J .•> Court

I ha t i reasmaL lu officer

would have stopped and arrested this defendant; and, therefore,
Detective Russo's

actions were not based

scheme,

his

but

committing
suspended

upon
a

Class

not

authority

R Misdemeanor:

license.

therefore,

legal

Harmon's

illegally

upon a pretextual

fc

namely,

incriminating

obtained;

stop

and

Harmon

driving

with a

statements

Harmon's

from

were,

motion

to

suppress her statements is therefore denied.
With regard to the evidence of drug paraphernalia, drugs
and additional incriminating statements made by Harmon during
the search of her home, the issue is whether this evidence was
obtained through an unconstitutional search.

Harmon claims her

consent to this warrantless search is invalid because it was
obtained under duress.
The Utah Court of Appeals addressed the requirements for
obtaining a voluntary consent in State v. Bobo,
(Utah

App.

1990) .

Specifically,

•• [voluntariness of consent

must

v. Whittenback.

factors to be weighed

621 P.2d

held

that

the

be decided after consideration

of the totality of the circumstances.11
State

Bobo

803 P.2d 1268

Id. , at 1273 [quoting

103, 106

(Utah

1980].

The

in determining the voluntariness of a

consent to search are as follows:
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(1) the absence of a claim of authority to search
by the officers; (2) the absence of an exhibition
of force by the officers; (3) a mere request to
search; (4) cooperation by the owner. . . and (5)
the absence of deception or trick on the part of
the officer(s).

Id*.
Moreover,

"[c]onsent while in custody does notf

render the consent involuntary.
the trial court to consider."

per se,

It is but a single element for

Id.. at 1273-4.

In this case, Harmon testified that Detective Russo told
her he would have to shoot her dog if it attacked the officers
and that this statement caused her to feel under duress prior
to her signing the written consent.

Detective Russo testified

that all discussions concerning the dog occurred after Harmon
signed the written consent to search.

The Court is inclined to

believe

over

Detective

Russo's

testimony

that

of Harmon's.

First, Harmon appeared to be very evasive as a witness and not
credible on this point.

Second, she was, in fact, permitted to

go into the house alone after giving her consent to take the
dog

out

into

the

back

yard.

Finally,

jeopardized by the search by the officers.

the

dog

was

never
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why she \ lid not give her written

consent voluntarily is that because her father had just been
released from the hospital, she felt pressure not to reveal her
arrest to him and other family member'-;.

However, she also

testified that prior to being stopped and arrested, she had
qi ne 1 L » he i parent's home where her mother was cooking dinner
and

learned

countryside.

that her

father

had

gone

for

i visit

to the

These facts do not support Harmon's claim that

she was under particular duress because of any health problem
on the part of her father at the time of signing the written
consent form.

Certainly it is not unusual for someone to be

apprehensive that family members will be upset to learn of that
person's arrest and pending criminal charges.

In light of the

totality of the circumstances in this case, the Court is not
persuaded that Harmon was in particular distress such that she
could not voluntarily sign the written consent to this search.
It further appears to the Court that Detective Russo acted
appropriately in obtaining Harmon's oral and written consent.
He testified he had informed Harmon multiple times that he was
not authorized to search her house without her consent and that
if she would not consent, he would have tu obtain a warrant
before he could search.

COOSd
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exhibition

of

force.

Although

Harmon was arrested for committing a Class B Misdemeanor, the
arrest was made subsequent to an open violation of the traffic
laws and, as such, it does not constitute a show of force
within the meaning

of the guidelines set forth under Bobo,

supra.
Further, Russo's testimony shows he merely made requests to
search

and

that

Harmon

understood

Russo

could

not

without her permission in the absence of a warrant.
Harmon

search
Indeed,

refused to consent to a search when Detective Russo

arrived at her home for the "knock and talk" and was permitted
to leave when she refused.
Finally, Detective Russo employed
to

induce

her consent.

Harmon

no deception or tricks

understood

Russo would

either her consent or a warrant to search her home.

need
Russo

indicated nothing more than that he would have to apply for a
warrant.

He made no representations that he would most likely

be granted a warrant.

Further, Russo had Mirandized Harmon on

two separate occasions: the final occasion being just before
Harmon signed the consent form.
All these actions clearly show that Russo did nothing to
limit Harmon's freedom of choice to give consent.

At the time

STATE V. HARMON
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consent was obtained, Harmon had been stopped for driving with
a

suspended

license and was enroute to jail pursuant to a

lawful stop and subsequent search which indicated that she had
possession
deception

of
or

controlled
coercion

was

substances
employed

on
to

hei:

person.

No

obtain

consent,

and

Harmon was not under duress or acting involuntarily when she
gave consent.

Thus, her motion to suppress due to allegedly

unconstitutional conduct by Russo is denied.
Counsel for the State is to prepare Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and an Order consistent with this ruli.m.3.
Dated this <&^V dav of June, 1992.

ANNE M. STIRBA^
-Jt-—.. .. 7
DISTRICT COURT J U D G E / " V ^
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

Case No. 921900308

v.
JULIE HARMON

Honorable Anne M. Stirba

Defendant.

This matter having come before this Court pursuant to the
Defendant's

Motion

to Suppress

and

the Court

having

read the

briefs submitted by the parties, having heard the testimony of the
witnesses

and

arguments

of

counsel

and

having

issued

its

Memorandum Decision dated June 3, 1991, the Court now hereby makes
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
Deputy

On

Sheriff

or
on

about

November

the Metro

19, 1992, Detective

Narcotics

Task

Force,

Russo, a

received a

telephone tip from an informant that Julie Harmon was distributing
narcotics at a single family dwelling located at 2904 South 9100
West in Salt Lake County.

r r\ 1

A

i

2.

At

approximately

6:00

p.m.,

that

evening,

Detective

Russo went to the address with the intention to walk up to the
door,

knock

and

ask

for

information

to

confirm

or

rebut

at

residence,

the

allegations in the telephone tip.
3.

When

Detective

Russo

arrived

the

he

observed Harmon in her car beginning to back out of the driveway
of the residence*

Detective Russo approached defendant Harmon,

identified himself, told her he had received a complaint that she
was distributing narcotics and asked if he could search her house.
4.

Harmon refused to let Detective Russo search her house,

stating that her father had recently suffered a heart attack and
was due to return home from the hospital and she was on her way to
visit him.
5.
6.

Harmon then drove away in her car.
Detective Russo

stayed outside Defendant's

and called to check on Harmon's driver's license.
that her license was suspended.

residence

He was informed

Harmon returned home and drove

around the block two times.
7.

Detective Russo saw defendant drive by twice and asked

a marked patrol unit to assist him in stopping the defendant for
driving on a suspended license.

Detective Russo and the uniformed

police officer then stopped Harmon in a parking lot near her home.
8.
Suspension.

Harmon

was

placed

under

Detective Russo conducted

arrest

for

Driving

on

a search incident to the

arrest and found a controlled substance on her person.

9.

Detective Russo had stopped and arrested approximately

12 persons for driving on a suspended license within the past year.
10.

Officers routinely excercise discretion as to whether

they arrest for Driving on Suspension or issue a citation.
11.
Detective

On the way to jail, post Miranda
Russo

that

she had been

afraid

H uimon admitted to
to

let him

into her

residence because, at one time, she had sold drugs and the house
contained drug paraphernalia.
12.

Harmon told Detective Russo that if he drove her back

to her house, she would let him in so that he could retrieve those
items.

Harmon said she would sign a consent torm to search her

house.

Detective Russo did not promise Harmon

permitting

i i .edich

I hei hi »i use and stated

probably go to jail anyway.
would

consent

to

the

any benefit

for

that Harmon would

Harmon again told Detective Russo she

search

of

her

house

and Detective

turned the car around and diave back ih Harmon's house.

Russo
On the

way back, he called for assistance to search Harmon's house.
13.

Upon arriving at Harmon's house and before exiting the

vehicle, Harmon was Mirandized again and she then signed a written
consent to search her house.
14.
Defendant

After

signing

he would

the consent

have

to

shoot

form, Detective Russo told

her

doq

if

it

attached

the

officers.
15.

Harmon was permitted to go into the house alone to take

the dog out into the back yard.
the search by the officers.

The dog was never jeopardized in

16.

Detective Russo and some uniformed

officers who had

arrived at the scene, proceeded inside the house.
various items of drug paraphernalia

Harmon pulled

and illegal drugs out from

underneath a sofa in the living room.
17.

During

the

search

of

the

defendant's

home,

the

defendant was permitted to telephone her brother, who was a police
officer, to seek his advice about what she should do under the
circumstances.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1*

Detective

Russo,

having

obtained

information

that

Harmon's driver's license was suspended, properly stopped Harmon
after he observed her driving.
2.

An

objective

reasonable

officer

would

have

stopped

Harmon for driving on a suspended license.
3.

Police officers exercise discretion as to whether they

arrest the offender or issue a citation.

This discretion was not

abused by Detective Russo when he arrested Harmon for Driving on
Suspension.
4.

Hamons's

arrest

was

made

subsequent

to

an

open

violation of the traffic laws and it does not constitute a show of
force within the meaning of the guidelines set forth in State v.
Bobo, 803 P2d 1268 (UT App. 1990).
5.

Harmons's

incriminating

statements

were

made

after

Detective Russo Mirandized her and were not illegally obtained.
6.

No deception or coercion was used by Detective Russo to

obtain Harmons' consent to search her house.
search

her

house

was

freely

and

Harmons' consent to

vonluntarily

given,

Deputy Russo acted appropriately in obtaining Harmon's

therefore
ora^and

7.

The facts in this case do not persuade the Court that a

different analysis should be used under Article 1, Section 14, of
the Utah Constitution.
8.

The search of Harmon's house was a legal search.

DATED t h i s ? ^ day ol
n t°
< *

1992.

BY THE COURT:

approved ^irl'i'o form
MARK R. MOFFAT
Attorney for the

Defendant

r-nmp,

:

iLcU IN CLERK S OffiCl
Salt Lake County Utah

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
RICHARD G. HAMP, Bar No. 4048
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State Street, Room S3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Telephone: (801) 468-3422

JUN 2 6 1992

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
v.
JULIE HARMON,

Case No. 921900308
Honorable Anne M. Stirba

Defendant.

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, it is therefore ordered that:
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby denied.
DATED this ^ A ^ d a y of S=A^fc2^, 1992

BY THE COURT:

Honorable Anne M. Stirba /\^.--rN
District Court Judge

approved as to form
MARK R. MOFFAT
Attorney for the Defendant

'*T

frPPFNPIX 3
Consent form

&***

Metro Narcotics Strike Force
IMETROPOLfTAN HAU OF.JUSTICE
\
315 EAST 200 SOUTH
\ SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111 .
\

(801) 799-3672

CONSENT TO SEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Date.

/"SO

Add. Location:

IS

If
G^t^7

n ^ /
"^

//&& °**'ko*.. /Suite No,

/isl^jA^A

, Utah Y"/Q * K
yi/lOAS

, having been informed

(Print)
of my rights per Miranda not to have a search made of the premises,
hereinafter mentioned, without a Search Warrant, of my right to
refuse to consent to such a search, hereby authorize;
P^ f
R
A v$SO
police officer and his agent
of the Metropolitan Narcotics Strike Force to conduct a complete
search of my person, premise(s) and/or vehicle at;
These officers are authorized by me to search and seize any
contraband or fruits of any crime while conducting a search on a
narcotics investigation.
This written permission is being giver, to me to the above
mentioned police officer voluntarily and without threats or
promises of any kind.

Signature
WitnessedJyj
(Name)

of

Add.

/

nn*-i£4

^/?C5
. Utah

(Name)
of
Add.

., Utah
EXHI3IT 1

